As the frequency of interstate wars is decreasing and violent non-state actors’ challenge to states is becoming more common, the subject of counterinsurgency is increasing in prominence for scholars and policy makers both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Especially the current counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as increasing references to Al Qaeda as a global insurgency have contributed to the growing importance of counterinsurgency.This research asks the question why sometimes battlefield success against the insurgents leads to an overall success in counterinsurgency and brings an end to the internal conflict, while other times it fails to achieve this outcome. Although states tend to resort to coercive (i.e., military) methods in order to eliminate insurgencies, these methods, in fact, have a mixed record of success. Even when states seem to inflict significant damage on the insurgents militarily, this does not necessarily bring an overall success in counterinsurgency.In light of a comparative case study of Turkey and Peru and the analysis of a number of additional cases, this research aims to identify ways in which states can most effectively deal with insurgent organizations and end conflict and violence within their borders. It proposes that in order to eliminate an insurgency, it is more important to find the best method that directly responds to the characteristics, goals, and external connections of the particular insurgent organization challenging the state than to focus on various military, economic, social, and cultural methods based on their generic advantages and disadvantages.